Type of Document Master's Thesis Author Sheredos, Benjamin Author's Email Address ben,sheredos@gmail.com URN etd-04202009-115011 Title Motivating Emotional Content Degree Master of Arts Department Philosophy Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title Andrea Scarantino Committee Chair George Graham Committee Member Michael Owren Committee Member Keywords
- Causal self-reference
- Intentions-in-action
- Emotional motivation
- Action tendencies
- Besires
- Pushmi-pullyu representations
- Action
- Phenomenology
- Intentionality
- Emotional content
- Direction of fit
- Feeling toward
- Feelings
- Emotions
Date of Defense 2009-04-13 Availability unrestricted Abstract Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation.Files
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