Type of Document Master's Thesis Author Thomas, Bradley Charles Author's Email Address bradley-thomas@uiowa.edu URN etd-07182008-152603 Title The Non-moral Basis of Cognitive Biases of Moral Intuitions Degree Master of Arts Department Philosophy Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title Eddy Nahmias Committee Chair Andrea Scarantino Committee Member Andrew Altman Committee Member Stephen Jacobson Committee Member Keywords
- Experimental Philosophy
- Moral Psychology
- Metaethics
- Moral Epistemology
- Moral intuitionism
Date of Defense 2008-05-27 Availability unrestricted Abstract Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism. As such, I attempt to show that the renewed argument is subject to an analogous objection as the old one; many cognitive biases of moral intuitions result from biases of non-moral judgments. Thus, the unreliability of moral intuitions due to biases (and the reason inferential justification was required) can be removed by clearing up the non-moral biases. Accordingly, biases of moral intuitions do not threaten a slightly qualified version intuitionism which posits non-inferential justification of intuitions when non-moral biases are not present. I also present an empirical study that lends initial support to my argument.Files
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