Type of Document Master's Thesis Author Owensby-Sandifer, Jessica Rae Author's Email Address jowensbysandifer@gmail.com URN etd-12012006-105803 Title Kripke, Chalmers and the Immediate Phenomenal Quality of Pain Degree Master of Arts Department Philosophy Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title Eddy Nahmias Committee Chair Andrea Scarantino Committee Member Sandra Dwyer Committee Member Keywords
- Consciousness
- Mind
- Kripke
- Chalmers
- Pain
- Physicalism
- Identity Theory
- Mind-Body Problem
Date of Defense 2006-11-28 Availability unrestricted Abstract One common element of Kripke’s and Chalmers’ reactions to physicalist theories of mind is their reliance upon the intuition that concepts about conscious experiences are essentially identified by the “immediate phenomenal quality” of the conscious experience, how the experience feels from the subjective point of view. I examine how Kripke’s and Chalmers’ critiques require that concepts about conscious experiences be identified by their subjective feel and then move on to provide some ways in which this intuition about concepts of conscious experience could be wrong. Specifically, the intuition is not consistent with our intuitions about unusual cases reported by pain researchers and does not take such cases to be genuine cases of pain. These inconsistencies weaken the intuition, making it problematic for any critique of identity theory or physicalism to rely heavily upon it.Files
Filename Size Approximate Download Time (Hours:Minutes:Seconds)
28.8 Modem 56K Modem ISDN (64 Kb) ISDN (128 Kb) Higher-speed Access Owensby-Sandifer_Jessica_200612_ma.pdf 60.36 Kb 00:00:16 00:00:08 00:00:07 00:00:03 < 00:00:01